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IMPACT OF GENDER AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN BOARDS OF DIRECTORS ON INTELLECTUAL 
CAPITAL PERFORMANCE 
 




This study examines the association between the gender and ethnic composition of boards of 
directors and firm performance in a transitional nation. In contrast to prior research that largely 
focuses on firm performance within a financial context, this study concentrates on intellectual capital 
performance. Using data collected from 84 South African, empirical results indicate a positive 
association between the percentage of female and non-white directors on the board and a firm’s 
intellectual capital performance. Additional analysis shows the designation of female directors as an 
insider has a negative effect of intellectual capital performance. Designation of female and non-white 
directors as outsiders, meanwhile, has a positive influence on a firm’s intellectual capital 
performance. Finally, there was no association between the percentage of non-white inside directors 
on the board and intellectual capital performance. 
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The modern business environment is one of 
enormous uncertainty and dynamic change. Firms are 
faced with ever increasing pressures from unstable 
capricious markets, new and complex information 
technology, widening globalization and considerable 
changes to the world’s social infrastructure (Porter, 
1986; Barlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Melin, 1992; 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1994). By the start of the new 
millennium, the economic infrastructures of many 
nations around the world had, or were going through, 
a significant transformation. For nearly two hundred 
years the properties that characterized the Industrial 
Age had defined business practices. Now, various 
business authorities recognize the driving force 
underlying the wealth-creation, performance and 
future survival of many firms is their intellectual 
capital (IC) (see, for example, Edvinsson and 
Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Luthy, 1998; Bontis, 
2000). 
As the factors defining the Information Age have 
grown in prominence, IC analysts have suggested 
firms must significantly overhaul antiquated 
managerial practices inherited from the Industrial 
Age (see Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), 2000 for a full review). The 
nature of IC dictates firms are increasingly reliant 
upon the development of intangible links with 
various stakeholders possessing resources 
quintessential to a firm’s future performance and 
survival (Brooking and Motta, 1996). Human 
resources, both current and potential, are often 
recognized as the essential component of IC that a 
firm must accumulate and fully utilize so as to 
optimize a firm’s performance and survival (Sveiby, 
2000). IC analysts have suggested a firm can best 
optimize its human resource capacity by fully 
drawing on all the various skills, knowledge and 
capabilities of this production factor (Pulic, 1998). 
This can be best achieved through diversification, 
particularly at the upper echelons of a firm.   
Corporate governance experts have long 
advocated a board of directors can have significant 
impact on a firm’s performance and future viability 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Siciliano, 1996). This 
corporate governance mechanism is viewed as an 
essential means by which a firm can develop and 
maintain intangible coalitions and alliances with 
various stakeholders, including its human resources 
(Gilbert and Ivancevich, 2000). To fully maximize 
the ability of a board of directors to enhance a firm’s 
future wealth-creation, performance and survival the 
composition of this corporate governance mechanism 
should not be overtly homogenous in nature 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). Increased gender and 
ethic diversity are often seen as two particular 
demographic features of a board of directors’ 
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composition that can enhance its effectiveness in 
influencing a firm’s potential (Provan, 1980; 
Chaganti, Mahjan and Sharma, 1985; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). 
Some prior empirical research has indicated a 
positive association between greater gender and 
ethnic diversity on a board and firm performance 
(Kesner, 1988; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). 
Questions, however, surround the applicability of 
these findings in the Information Age. That is, prior 
research defined firm performance using accounting- 
or market-based measures, or a combination of both 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). Such 
measures of performance focus solely primarily on 
physical capital (Bontis, 2000). As IC is now the 
pivotal factor underlying a firm’s future wealth-
creation potential and survivability, research should 
utilize measures based on this concept and not 
physical capital (Roos, Roos, Dragonetti and 
Edvinsson, 1997). Another deficiency of the vast 
bulk of previous research is that it used data drawn 
largely from developed economies, particularly the 
United States (see, for example, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Klein, 1996). Globalization, 
however, has increased the importance of other 
economies. Recent studies have shown the regulatory 
framework, economic conditions, capital market 
strength and existing governance structure in 
different nations may have contrasting affects on the 
association between a board of directors’ 
demographic features and a firm’s performance 
(Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). Research on the 
affect of corporate governance features on firm 
performance in alternative economies, particularly in 
transitional economies, is imperative to develop a full 
understanding of the impact and value of governance 
structures across broader environmental expanses.  
To the knowledge of the authors, empirical 
research has yet to examine the potential relationship 
between board of directors’ gender and ethnic 
diversity and a firm’s IC performance. This study 
addresses deficiencies in the literature by analyzing 
the aforementioned associations using an 
investigation of eighty-four firms listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Initial empirical tests 
indicated a positive association between the 
percentage of female and non-white directors on the 
boards of South African publicly listed firms and IC 
performance. These tests, however, ignored the 
possible moderating influence of a director’s 
designation as an insider or an outsider. Tests 
addressing this possible moderating factor found that 
as the percentage of inside female directors increased 
a firm’s IC performance declined. Conversely, as the 
percentage of outside female and non-white directors 
on a board increased a firm’s IC performance 
improved. Finally, there was no significant 
association between the percentage of inside non-
white directors on a board and a firm’s IC 
performance. Overall, empirical findings support the 
general tenants of resource dependence theory, the 
underlying conceptual framework of this study.  
Findings from this study should interest 
policymakers, managers, shareholder, relevant 
stakeholder groups and researchers in South Africa 
and internationally. The current understanding of 
corporate governance is enhanced and broadened by 
the results of this study. For example, findings 
illustrate the impact of governance structures in a 
different business environment. Also, findings 
provide the initial evidence of the affect of board 
composition characteristics on a firm’s IC 
performance. These findings enhance the current 
understanding of corporate strategies and policies 
that can be used to increase a firm’s effective 
management of its IC.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. The next section provides a brief review of 
IC, the underlying conceptual framework and 
development of testable propositions. The research 
method is then discussed followed by an outline of 
empirical results. The final section discusses the 
empirical results, concluding remarks and ideas for 
future research. 
 
2. IC, Underlying Theoretical Perspective 
and Development of Propositions 
 
Overview of IC: Its Definition, 
Components and Measurement 
 
The phrase IC has its origins from the end of the 
1960’s (Sullivan, 2000). It was not until the start of 
the 1990s, however, that the concept of IC gained 
wider use (Bontis, 2000). At the start of the new 
millennium IC is widely recognized as the pivot 
factor underlying a firm’s future wealth-creation and 
survivability. As a research discipline, the study of 
IC is still within its infancy. In general, IC research 
has followed two major avenues of investigation. 
One stream has sought to define and describe this 
discipline. As yet, a generally accepted definition of 
IC remained elusive. Initial definitions perceived IC 
to be synonymous with intangible assets. Klein and 
Prusak (as quoted in Brooking, 1996, p.12), for 
example, defined IC as “material that has been 
formalized, captured, and leveraged to produce a 
higher-valued asset.” Similarly, Brookings (1996, 
p.12) stated IC was “given to the combined 
intangible assets which enable the company to 
function.” Recent definitions have attempted to 
broaden the concept of IC to reflect a broader 
essence. Stewart (1997, p. 67), for example, defined 
IC as “packaged useful knowledge” (see endnote 1). 
Components of IC have been debated in the 
literature with a variety of models having emerged. 
IC experts, however, generally recognize three major 
underlying components: (1) human resource capital; 
(2) structural capital; and (3) customer capital (see 
endnote 2). Of these, human resource capital is 
usually distinguished as the most significant driver of 
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IC value creation. A Danish Trade and Industry 
Development Council Taskforce (1996), for example, 
stated the pivotal strategy in developing a firm’s IC 
base revolved around the effective arrangement of its 
structural capital around it human resources. Pulic 
(2000, p.2) also wrote a firm’s future is now tied “to 
knowledge and it is the ability of these employees to 
transform it into profitable action.” He (Pulic, 1998, 
p.8) further stated that in a “knowledge based 
economy the responsible party for the achieved 
market results are definitely the employees.” 
The second major avenue of IC research focuses 
on developing performance measures (Guthrie and 
Petty, 2000). Traditional measures (see endnote 3) 
have been criticized for their inability to adequately 
measure a firm’s performance in the Information Age 
(see, for example, Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Roos et 
al., 1997; Pulic and Bornemann, 1998; Sveiby, 
2001). For example, traditional measures have been 
criticized for being too narrow in nature, measuring a 
firm’s performance in terms of only its physical 
capital (Pulic, 1998). In contrast, IC (see endnote 4) 
measures have attempted to capture performance 
with respect to a firm’s complete capital structure; 
that is, physical and IC.  
Measures of IC performance can be classified 
into five major groups: (1) direct IC methods (DIC) 
(see endnote 5); (2) market capitalization methods 
(MC) (see endnote 6); (3) output oriented-process 
methods (OOP); (4) return on assets methods (ROA) 
(see endnote 6); and (5) scorecard methods (SC) (see 
endnote 7) (Luthy, 1998; Williams, 2000; Sveiby, 
2001). The literature describes various advantages 
and disadvantages associated with each major group. 
For example, DIC and SC measures provide a more 
comprehensive perception of a firm’s IC performance 
than predominantly financial metric MC and ROA 
approaches (Sveiby, 2001). Measures synonymous 
with DIC and SC methods, however, are generally 
customized to reflect the nature of each individual 
firm making comparability difficult (Williams, 2000; 
Sveiby, 2001). The aim of this paper is not to rectify 
the conceptual, epistemological and methodological 
differences between the respective measures of IC 
performance (see endnote 8). The approach used in 
this paper to measure IC performance and 
justification for selecting this approach is described 
below. 
 
Relationship of Resource-Dependence 
Theory to IC 
 
Emergence of IC has further intensified the 
discontent with the traditional product-based (or 
competitive advantage) view of a firm (Sullivan, 
2000; Hoque, Mia and Amal, 2001). In the 
Information Age emerged alternative views have 
developed. A prominent alternative capturing the 
ideals of IC is resource-dependence theory (see, for 
example, Barney, 1986, 1991; Connor, 1991; Grant, 
1991). Resource-dependence theorists view firms as 
a bundle of unique resources (Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995). Social exchange and the 
efficient use of resources are the driving forces for 
establishing a competitive advantage and improved 
performance (Barney, 1991). Factors synonymous 
with IC are increasingly recognized as the driving 
force behind a firm establishing a competitive 
advantage. Teece (2000, p.35), for example, wrote 
that a firm’s pursuit of competitive advantage “flows 
from the creation, ownership, protection and use of 
difficult-to-imitate commercial and industrial 
knowledge assets.” 
Resource-dependence theorists argue a firm 
responds to, and becomes dependent upon actors, 
organizations or other firms that control resources 
critical to operations, and over which the firm has 
limited control (see, for example, Barney, 1991; 
Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995a). 
Under these circumstances, a firm is motivated to 
undertake action to minimize any potential loss in 
power due to the reliance on others for resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Prahalad and Hamel, 
1994). By accumulating and gaining control over the 
unique, or difficult to duplicate, resources it requires, 
a firm can establish a competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). It is argued the accumulation and access to 
resources is established via alliances and coalitions 
that may take considerable time (Provan, 1980; 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). Resource-
dependence theorists consequently view a firm’s 
resources as being somewhat ‘sticky’ such that they 
cannot be readily added or discarded (Grant, 1991). 
As a result, in at least the short run, firms must 
operate and exploit the resources it already has 
accumulated. Consistent with views expressed in the 
IC literature, resource-dependence theorists view 
human resources as the most important firm-level 
resource required for establishing a competitive 
advantage (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Skills, 
knowledge and capabilities of human resources are 
perhaps the most sustainable and renewable of assets 
to a firm, but generally extremely difficult to imitate 
(Grant, 1991). Control of human resource attributes 
remains in the hands of individual employees. A 
firm, therefore, is highly susceptible to human 
resource movements (Shrivastava, 1995b). For 
instance, if key employees moved to another firm, 
essential knowledge, skills and capabilities are also 
transferred. In a worse case scenario, the transfer can 
significantly reduce a firm’s competitive advantage. 
In the Information Age it is imperative a firm 
establish strong coalitions with its human resources 
so as preserve and exploit more effectively the skills, 
knowledge and capabilities of this resource.  
 
Diversity on a Firm’s Board of Directors: 
The Mix of Gender and Ethnic 
Backgrounds 
 
Resource-dependence theorists and IC analysts argue 
that all facet of human resources need to be fully 
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utilized (see, for example, Barney, 1991; Grant, 
1991; Pulic, 1998; Sveiby, 2000, 2001). This will 
best enable a firm to increase its performance and 
wealth-creation potential. Diversification of a firm’s 
human resource structure, with regard to its gender 
and ethnic mix, is often viewed as a necessary 
requirement to optimize this essential resource 
(Siciliano, 1996). Human resource diversity provides 
a variety of advantages. Iles and Auluck (1993), for 
example, suggested a diversified workforce facilitates 
greater problem solving skills and synergy. 
Katzenbach and Associates (1995) argued diversity 
promotes wider creativity and flexibility that enables 
a firm to adjust more rapidly to the changing and 
dynamic business environment. In particular, 
corporate governance researchers regularly suggest a 
diversified and well-balanced board of directors can 
significantly enhance a firm’s performance (see, for 
example, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Williams and 
O’Reilly, 1997; Buck, Filatitechey and Wright, 
1998). 
Resource-dependence and corporate governance 
theorists recognize a board of directors as an essential 
mechanism that can enhance and create the coalitions 
with the stakeholders controlling resources required 
by a firm (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Each director 
brings a collection of unique and different 
experiences, attachments and points of view to a 
board (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). If members’ 
perceptions, views and backgrounds are relatively 
homogenous in nature there is a higher likelihood 
decision-making strategies of this corporate 
governance mechanism will be single-minded, 
predictable and inflexible (Westphal and Zajac, 
1998). Boards with a more diversified mix of 
members with better enable it to address the 
challenges of an uncertain and dynamic business 
environment (Daily, Certo and Dalton, 1999; Gilbert 
and Ivancevich, 2000).  
From the literature a variety of reasons can be 
suggested to support how greater gender and ethnic 
diversity can enhance a boards influence on a firm’s 
performance with respect to IC. For example, 
dissimilarities in the gender and ethnic backgrounds 
of directors can contribute different sociological 
perceptions and understandings to the decision-
making process (Coffey and Wang, 1998). As a 
result, a board is better able to instigate more 
comprehensive policies, strategies, activities and 
projects (Cox and Blake, 1991). Greater gender and 
ethnic diversity also enhances the board’s flexibility 
in its decision-making process due to a wider set of 
perceptions and views (Gilbert and Ivancevich, 
2000). This will enable a firm to better facilitate 
strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Consequently, a firm will be able to respond more 
rapidly to changes in the dynamic and uncertain 
business environment of the Information Age. 
In the context of human resources, Cox and Blake 
(1991) suggested increased gender and ethnic 
diversity on a board of directors enhances a firm’s 
ability to compete for skilled employees in the labour 
market. Consequently, firm IC performance will be 
promoted. A more diversified board will be better 
able to develop well-rounded recruiting policies and 
strategies, and working conditions attractive to a 
broader spectrum of potential employees and exploit 
its existing human resource capital (Powell, 1990; 
Shrader, Blackburn and Iles, 1997). Diversity is 
thought to intensify the sensitivity of a board to 
requirements of the workforce, thereby, enabling it to 
increase the capacity to instigate work practice 
initiatives addressing the needs of its employees and 
employee pressure groups such as unions (Shrader, 
Hoffman and Stearns, 1991). Also, diversification 
enables a board and firm to react more readily to 
changing workforce conditions, including those of a 
sensitive nature such sexual harassment (Daum, 
1998; Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Gilbert and 
Ivancevich, 2000). Overall, a diversified board of 
directors enables a firm to create alliances and 
coalitions with a broader spectrum of human 
resources. Hence, a greater range of knowledge, 
skills and capabilities can be accumulated and 
exploited, thereby increasing a firm’s IC potential. 
Greater board diversity can also improve a firm’s 
IC performance through its influence over other 
components of this concept such as that related to 
consumers. With developments in information 
technology and increased globalization the consumer 
base of many firms have widened (Stewart, 1997). 
Firms best able to encapsulate this expanded 
consumer base will gain a considerable competitive 
advantage (Luthy, 1998). A diversified board of 
directors will enable a firm to generate broader 
initiatives, such as advertising and consumer policies, 
demonstrating greater imagination and sensitivity 
(Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). These broader 
initiatives will hopefully appeal to the wider 
consumer audience enabling the firm to establish and 
sustain relationships with customers (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Young, 
Stedham and Beekun, 2000). Further, as customers’ 
tastes change, firms having greater flexibility in their 
decision-making structure will be better able to make 
rapid adjustments to maintain or improve it position 
(Moscovivi and Faucheaux, 1972; Nemeth, 1986; 
Laughlin, 1992). A diversified board enhances 
flexibility (McGrath, 1984; Hitt and Tyler, 1991). 
 
Overview of Prior Empirical Findings 
 
Normative studies have suggested a positive 
association between increased gender and ethnic 
diversity on a board of directors and firm 
performance. Empirical findings, however, are 
somewhat mixed (see, for example, Kesner, 1988; 
Shrader et al., 1991; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; 
Shrader et al., 1997). Early research failed to find a 
significant association between a board’s level of 
gender diversity and a firm’s physical performance 
(see, for example, Babchuk Marsey and Gordon, 
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1960; Zald, 1969). The lack of association was 
attributed to the business environment of the time, a 
period not conducive to women in the workforce. 
Despite changes in the business environment, results 
continue to vary. Provan (1980), Kesner (1988) and 
Shrader et al., (1991), for example, found that as the 
percentage of women on a board increased, firm 
performance was enhanced. Research by Zahra and 
Stanton (1988), Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) and 
Shrader et al., (1997), however, did not support this 
association.  
With respect to ethnic diversity, a positive 
association between this feature of board composition 
and firm performance has been supported by some 
empirical studies (see, for example, McGrath, 1984; 
Nemeth, 1986; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Hitt and 
Tyler, 1991; Williams and O’Reilly, 1997; Crano and 
Chen, 1998).  Other related empirical research has 
supported the proposition that an increased ethnic 
mix stimulates wider intellective thinking and 
imagination in the decision-making process of a 
board, thereby enhancing a firm’s performance (see, 
for example, Moscovivi and Faucheaux, 1972; 
Nemeth, 1986; Laughlin, 1992). Some other 
empirical research, however, has found contrasting 
results (see, for example, Jackson, Stone and 
Alvarez, 1992; O’Reilly, Williams and Barsade, 
1997). Using the tenants of self-categorization theory 
the lack of an association is attributed to those from a 
majority ethnic group classify minorities as outsiders 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). As a result, the 
contributions and suggestions of minority group 
board members are ignored (see, for example, Tajfel, 
Sheikh and Gardner, 1964; Mackie, 1987; Miller and 
Brewer, 1996; Erb, Bohner, Schmaizie and Rank, 
1998). 
Prior normative and empirical studies, including 
those based on resource-dependence theory, have 
indicated a director’s designation as an insider may 
moderate the association between gender and ethnic 
diversity on a board of directors and firm 
performance (see, for example, Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Young et al, 2000). 
Inside directors are viewed to be dependent on the 
firm for their principal employment or financial 
security. Due to this relationship, inside directors will 
favour decisions that enhance their self-interests. 
This decision-making process will favour the 
acceptance of projects that emphasize short-term 
financial goals and those having less risk attached. 
Such projects, however, will not enhance IC 
performance. That is, the IC literature frequently 
recognizes the development of this form of business 
capital requires the establishment of long-term 




From the above discussion, the overarching 
proposition is that greater gender and ethnic diversity 
on the boards of directors of South African publicly 
listed firms were better placed to acquire the key 
resources underlying IC. Consequently, their IC 
performance is enhanced. Influence of gender and 
ethnic diversity on IC performance, however, will be 
moderated by a director’s designation as an 
insider/outsider. The following testable propositions 
are, therefore, formed: 
Proposition 1a: There is a positive association 
between the percentage of female directors on the 
board of directors of South African publicly listed 
firms and the level of IC performance. 
Proposition 1b: There is a negative association 
between the percentage of female inside directors 
on the board of directors of South African 
publicly listed firms and the level of IC 
performance. 
Proposition 2a: There is a positive association 
between the percentage of non-white directors on 
the board of directors of South African publicly 
listed firms and the level of IC performance. 
Proposition 2b: There is a negative association 
between the percentage of non-white inside 
directors on the board of directors of South 
African publicly listed firms and the level of IC 
performance. 
 
3. The Research Method, Data and Model 
Selection of Nation and the Sample Data 
 
Several major reasons support the selection of South 
Africa. First, South Africa is a transitional economy 
of increasing importance in the world business 
environment, particularly in the African region 
(Klein, 1999). Second, following the removal of 
apartheid, the South African business environment 
has undergone sizeable adjustments that have lead to 
considerable uncertainty (Maharaj, 1999; 
Shunmaugan, 1999). South African directors and 
management, therefore, are under greater pressure to 
develop appropriate practices to meet the challenges 
of this uncertain business environment. Another 
reason for selecting South Africa stems from the 
extensive encouragement of the South African 
government for greater participation of women in the 
general workforce and the promotion of non-whites 
to higher positions of management (Central Statistics, 
1998; Minister of Labour, 1998). South African 
firms, therefore, face more pressure to modify 
strategies and policies to address the regulatory 
provisions of new government acts and directives. 
Finally, the South African government strongly 
recognized that if the national infrastructure was to 
develop beyond its status as a transitional economy, 
there was a need to base its development on IC rather 
than physical capabilities (Klein, 1999; Barricentos, 
McClenaghan, and Orton, 2000). As a result of the 
initiatives of the South African government to 
promote the development of IC, it is reasonable to 
expect South Africa business leaders to be familiar 
with and have potentially instigated action to enhance 
the IC of a firm. 
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Data for this study was directly obtained from a 
firm’s annual report, a returned questionnaire and 
several related databases. Information was drawn 
from each annual report to compute a firm’s IC 
performance, establish board composition 
characteristics and measure control variables. The 
questionnaire enabled the capture of information on a 
firm’s board of directors not found in their annual 
report or from other alternative sources (see endnote 
9). Databases were used to reconfirm data collected 
from a firm’s annual report and returned 
questionnaire such as board composition features.  
Due to difficulties in acquiring information from 
private firms, the initial sample population comprised 
all 751 firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange at the end December 31, 2001. One 
hundred and twenty eight firms were excluded 
because “regulation masks efficiency differences 
across firms, potentially rendering governance 
mechanisms less important” (Vafeas and Theodorou, 
1998, p.391). A survey sample of one hundred and 
twenty publicly listed firms was then randomly 
selected. 
Following the random selection of one hundred 
and twenty firms, a letter and questionnaire was sent 
to their headquarters. The letter requested the latest 
annual report published prior to December 31, 2001. 
After a period of eight weeks, a follow-up letter and 
questionnaire was sent to those firms not replying to 
the initial request. From the initial request sixty-nine 
annual reports and questionnaires were received. A 
further twenty-six annual reports and questionnaire 
were received from the follow-up letter. Non-
response bias tests showed no significant variations. 
(see endnote 10). Of the ninety-five firms returning 
requested documentation, twenty-one were excluded. 
Seven firms were removed as they were found to be 
subsidiaries of large foreign multinational firms 
based in the United States and United Kingdom. This 
exclusion was done to minimize possible extraneous 
external influences. Documentation from the 
remaining four firms was found to be incomplete. 
 
Measure of Dependent Variable - IC 
Performance 
 
As noted above, there is no universal agreement of an 
appropriate measure of IC. To determine an 
appropriate measure of IC performance to be used in 
this study from methods described in the literature a 
screening criterion was developed. This criterion was 
developed with consideration for such circumstances 
as the study’s research objectives and question, data 
availability and underlying conceptual framework. 
The literature supports the respective features of the 
screening criterion (see, for example, Luthy, 1998; 
Schneider, 1999; Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Petty and 
Guthrie, 2000; Sveiby, 2001). The screening criterion 
is defined as follows:  
(a) Measure is consistent with the underlying 
tenants of resource-dependence theory; that is, 
firm viewed as a bundle of resources with a 
particular emphasis on human resources. 
(b) The approach is based on a firm’s total capital 
structure and major individual components of 
IC. 
(c) The measure utilized conventional accounting 
techniques, thereby, increasingly the 
reliability of the measure as calculation uses 
audited data. 
(d) The technique can be consistently and readily 
applied to various firm structures ensuring 
comparability of measured performance. 
(e) It enables the collection of evidence of IC 
leverage to key success processes. 
(f) The measure can be calculated and used by 
both internal and external stakeholders, such 
as management, investors and pressure 
groups. 
(g) The methodology used is relatively 
straightforward enabling greater cognitive 
understanding. 
After reviewing various measures of IC proposed 
in the literature, data availability and the study’s 
research objectives, the Value Added Intellectual 
Coefficient (VAIC) methodology developed by 
Ante Pulic (1998) was determined to be most 
applicable proxy the purposes of this study. This 
methodology demonstrated all of the aspects of the 
screening criterion defined above. Further, there is 
strong support for the validity and application of this 
measure in the literature (see, for example, Pulic and 
Bornemann, 1999; Schneider, 1999; Williams, 2000). 
VAIC is an output oriented-process 
methodology that can be applied across different 
business forms and at various levels of operation 
(Pulic and Bornemann, 1999). This methodology is 
considered a “universal indicator showing the 
intellectual abilities of a business unit’s value 
creation ability and represents a measure of business 
efficiency in the knowledge based economy” (Pulic, 
1998, p.3). Algebraically, VAIC is the total sum of 
the value creation efficiency a business unit’s 
physical capital and two major components of IC 
(namely human resource and structural capital). 
Designed to provide an indication of a business unit’s 
IC efficiency, the higher the VAIC value the better 
a business unit’s management has utilized the 
potential value creation from the available physical 
capital and IC.  
Several major underlying assumptions encompass 
the VAIC methodology. First, it assumes that in the 
Information Age a measure of a performance is 
defined by firm’s value creation, or output. Pulic’s 
(1998) methodology focuses on value creation, value 
creators and value creation activities. This contrasts 
to traditional measures that define performance in 
terms of inputs (Schneider, 1999). VAIC views a 
firm as a dynamic system of highly connected and 
interactive relations, highly sensitive to external 
inputs. That is, a firm is a system that seeks to create 
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additional value above its inputs (Pulic, 1998). A 
firm generates value creation by establishing 
alliances and coalitions with the various required 
resources and value creators (employees, the social 
environment (society, community) customers, 
suppliers, investors and government). Finally, 
employees are perceived as the major resource group 
driving a firm’s value creation, an assumption 
consistent with resource-dependence theory and 
views expressed in the IC literature (see, for example, 
Pulic, 1998; Pulic and Bornemann, 1999). 
In computing VAIC values for each South 
African publicly listed firm included in this study, 
information was directed obtained from the latest 
annual report published prior to December 31, 2001. 
The five major steps used to calculate VAIC values 
are described in detail in Appendix A. 
 
Measure of Independent Variables 
 
Consistent with prior research (see, for example, 
Coffey and Wang, 1998), gender diversity 
(PerGender) is measured as the percentage of female 
representation on the board of directors of each South 
African publicly listed firm at the time their latest 
annual report prior to December 31, 2001 was 
published. Two steps were involved in the 
development of a proxy measure of ethnic diversity. 
The first step involved directors being classified as 
being either white or non-white. This categorization 
is consistent with recent South African government 
and legislative definitions of the major ethnic groups 
in this nation. For example, the Employment Equity 
Bill defines South Africa citizens as being either 
white or black (non-white) (Minister of Labour, 
1998). According to this bill, “black (non-white) 
people” were defined as a “generic term describing 
Africans, Coloureds and Indians.” Following this 
dichotomous classification, ethnic diversity 
(PerEthnic) was measured as the percentage of non-
white representation on the board of directors at the 
time the latest annual report prior to December 31, 
2001 was published.  
To analyze the affect of a director’s 
insider/outsider designation on the association 
between a board of directors’ gender and ethnic 
diversity, and firm’s IC performance, insiders were 
defined as those directly employed by the firm, or 
individuals with likely professional ties (such as 
lawyers, accountants and consultants) with the firm. 
This definition is consistent with prior research (see, 
for example, Vance, 1955, 1964; Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992; Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000). 
From this distinction the following four proxy 
measures are formed:  
(a) InsidePerGender: Percentage of inside 
female representation on the board of 
directors at the time the latest annual report 
prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
(b) OutsidePerGender: Percentage of outside 
female representation on the board of 
directors at the time the latest annual report 
prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
(c) InsidePerEthnic: Percentage of inside non-
white representation on the board of 
directors at the time the latest annual report 
prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
(d) OutsidePerEthnic: Percentage of outside 
non-white representation on the board of 
directors at the time the latest annual report 
prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
 
Measure of Control Factors 
 
To test Propositions 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b multiple 
regression analysis was used. Each multiple 
regression model tested included five control factors 
(leverage; dividend yield; firm size; industry 
influence; and ownership concentration) drawn from 
a review of prior corporate governance literature (see, 
for example, Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Daily and 
Dalton, 1992; Hill and Jones, 1992; Vafeas and 
Afxentiou, 1998). Proxy measures for each control 
factor, and predicted direction of the relationship 
with VAIC, are briefly described as follows: 
(1) Leverage (Lev): - total debt divided by total 
shareholders’ equity as reported in each 
firm’s annual report; negative relationship to 
dependent variable. 
(2) Dividend Yield (DivYield): - percentage of 
cash dividends paid during 2001 divided by 
total shareholders’ equity; positive 
relationship to dependent variable. 
(3) Firm Size (Size): - natural log of annual 
sales as reported in each firm’s annual 
report; positive relationship to dependent 
variable. 
(4) R&D Sensitivity (R&DSen): - dummy 
variable with firm’s determined to be 
research and development intensive (see 
endnote 11) coded a one (1), otherwise 
coded a zero (0) (Wruck, 1993; Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998); positive relationship to 
dependent variable. 
(5) Ownership Concentration (OwnerCon): - 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by 
the firm’s major shareholders divided the 
company’s total number of outstanding 
shares. A firm’s major shareholder was 
defined as a shareholder holding more than 
5% of the company’s total outstanding 





Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. With respect 
to board of director characteristics, the average 
number of directors is higher amongst South African 
publicly listed firms than in developed nations such 
as the United States and United Kingdom (see, for 
example, Main and Johnson, 1993; Conyon and 
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Mallin, 1997; Dalton et al., 1999). Also, the mean 
percentage of inside director representation was 
slightly higher than recent studies in developed 
nations (see, for example, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996; Johnson et al., 1996). Share ownership 
amongst directors of South African publicly listed 
firms is comparable to levels reported in other 
nations (Vafas and Theodorou, 1998). Finally, the 
mean VAIC value is comparable to other studies 
(see, for example, Pulic, 1998; Williams, 2001). 
 
{Insert Table 1 About Here} 
 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the composition 
of gender and ethnic diversity on the boards of 
directors of South African publicly listed firms. The 
percentage of publicly listed firms in South Africa 
without any female representation on their board of 
directors was higher than that reported in developed 
nations (see, for, example, Daum, 1998; Daily et al., 
1999). Of South African publicly listed firms with 
female directors, representation was generally: (a) 
limited to only one or two directorships; and (b) were 
predominantly designated as outsiders. These 
findings are consistent with those reported in other 
nations (see, for example, Daum, 1998; Daily et al., 
1999). Finally, results indicated that as the absolute 
number of female directors on a board increased the 
mean VAIC values also improved. 
 
{Insert Table 2 About Here} 
 
As for the percentage of South African publicly 
listed firms having one or more non-white directors 
on their board of directors, values reported in Table 2 
were comparable to findings in other nations. This 
result is not unexpected given the ethnic mix in South 
Africa and intensive governmental efforts to promote 
greater non-white representation in the management 
of publicly listed companies. With respect to mean 
VAIC values, there was not obvious positive or 
negative trend as the absolute number of non-white 
directors on the board of South African publicly 
listed firms increased. It is noted, however, that the 
mean VAIC value for firms with three or more non-
white directors was considerably higher than firms 
with an all white board.  
Independent Student t-test findings in Table 3 
Panel A show the mean VAIC value of South 
African publicly listed firms with female 
representation on their board was significantly 
greater than counterparts without such representation. 
Similarly, the mean VAIC value of South African 
publicly listed firms with non-white directors was 
significantly greater than those without (see Table 3 
Panel B).  
 
{Insert Table 3 About Here} 
 
Results of three multiple regression models (see 
endnote 12) to test Propositions 1a and 2a are 
reported in Table 4. Two models separately tested the 
association between each independent and dependent 
variables (Table 4 Panel A and B). The third model 
included both two independent variables 
simultaneously (Table 4 Panel C). The f-value for 
each model was significant at the 1% level. 
Explanatory power ranged from a high of 48.1 
percent (Table 4 Panel A) to a low of 32.5 percent 
(Table 4 Panel B). Coefficients representing 
PerGender (p<0.001; see Table 4 Panels A and C) 
and PerEthnic (p<0.05; see Table 4 Panels B and C) 
were statistically significant Directional signs of all 
these coefficients were as predicted. 
 
{Insert Table 4 About Here} 
 
Three further multiple regression models tested 
Propositions 1b and 2b (see Table 5). Each model 
was highly significant (p<0.001) with the explanatory 
power of each model ranging from a high of 55.3 
percent (Table 5 Panel A) to a low of 36.4 (Table 5 
Panel B) percent. All coefficients representing 
InsidePerGender, OutsidePerGender and 
OutsidePerEthnic were statistically significant 
(p<0.05, 0<0.001 and p<0.10 respectively). 
Directional signs for these coefficients were as 
predicted. In contrast, the coefficients for 
InsidePerEthnic were not statistically significant in 
either model that included this independent variable 
(Table 5 Panel B and C). Also, the directional sign of 
the coefficients related to InsidePerEthnic were not 
as predicted. 
 
{Insert Table 5 About Here} 
 
Coefficients representing four of the five control 
factors (Lev, DivYield, R&DSen and OwnerCon) 
were statistically significant in all the multiple 
regression models tested (see Tables 4 and 5). 
Statistical significance of these coefficients, however, 
did vary across each multiple regressions. 
Coefficients for the remaining control factor, Size, 
were not statistically significant in any of the 
multiple regression models tested. The directional 
signs for all coefficients related to the control factors 
were as predicted in each multiple regression 
conducted (see Tables 4 and 5). 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
Based on univariate and multivariate analysis it is 
concluded there is a strong positive association 
between the percentage of female directors on the 
boards of South African publicly listed firms and IC 
performance. Empirical findings also showed that as 
the percentage of non-white directors on the boards 
of South African publicly increased, IC performance 
also improved. It is conclusion of this study, 
therefore, that the empirical results support the 
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acceptance of Proposition 1a and Proposition 2a. 
These empirical findings are consistent with some 
prior research of the affect of a board of directors’ 
gender and ethnic diversity on a firm’s performance 
(Provan, 1980; Kesner, 1988; Shrader et al., 1991). 
Results from this study, however, expand earlier 
findings. Prior research showed the two 
aforementioned characteristics of board composition 
affected a firm’s physical capital performance. This 
study demonstrated the influence of gender and 
ethnic diversity of a board of directors extends to 
encompass a firm’s IC performance. This result is of 
importance because IC is now the underlying factor 
of a firm’s wealth-creation and survivability.  
Aside from examining the direct association 
between a board of directors’ gender and ethnic 
diversity and a firm’s IC performance, additional 
empirical research attempted to determine the 
possible moderating affects of a directors’ 
inside/outside designation. With respect to gender 
diversity, empirical findings indicated that as the 
percentage of inside female representation on the 
boards of directors of South African publicly listed 
firms increased, this had a negative impact on IC 
performance. Consider, outside designation had a 
positive influence on the dependent variable. It is 
concluded, based on these results, that Proposition 1b 
is supported. As with female directors, designation of 
non-white directors as outsiders also had a positive 
influence on IC performance. Conversely, there was 
no significant association between the percentage of 
inside non-white directors and IC performance. 
Consequence Proposition 2b is rejected. 
Failure of empirical findings to support 
Proposition 2b was not consistent with findings in 
prior studies. Self-categorization theory and the 
South African social infrastructure may assist in 
explaining this discrepancy. Proponents of self-
categorization theory argue individuals construct 
social identities to classify themselves and others into 
social categories based on salient demographic 
features such as ethnic background (see, for example, 
Jackson et al., 1992; O’Reilly et al., 1997). Despite 
the removal of apartheid social animosities from that 
period are still likely to exist in South Africa’s social 
infrastructure. White and non-white directors, 
therefore, may categorize themselves with other 
members of the board that share the same ethnic 
background due to a shared social commonality. 
Consequently, decisions of non-white directors may 
be influenced more by their social connection to 
directors of a similar ethnic background than their 
designation as an inside representative. 
Finally, empirical findings related to four of the 
five control variables (leverage, dividend yield, 
research and development sensitivity and ownership 
concentration) were consistent with previous results 
reported in the corporate governance literature 
(Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1992; 
Hill and Jones, 1992; Vafeas and Afxentiou, 1998; 
Vafas and Theodorou, 1998). Two speculative 
reasons are offered to explain the lack of an 
association between firm size and IC performance. 
First, the largest firms in South African are 
predominantly traditional in nature (that is, being 
manufacturing and mining firms) driven essentially 
physical capital (Central Statistics, 1998; Klein, 
1999). Directors of such firms, therefore, may lack 
experience in IC management, or have an incentive 
to improve this aspect of a firm’s capital structure. 
Second, IC is a discipline still within its infancy. 
Directors and management of larger firms may yet 
have sufficient understanding of this concept and the 
threat of poor IC performance to the firm. The 
incentive to focus on management techniques to 
enhance IC performance, therefore, may be lacking. 
 
Concluding Remarks and Future 
Research Ideas 
 
This study broke with prior corporate governance and 
IC research in two major ways. First, to the 
knowledge of the author, this study provided the first 
empirical analysis of the association between board 
of director composition characteristics (gender and 
ethnic diversity) and a firm’s IC performance. Prior 
research has examined the affect of such board of 
director composition characteristics on firm 
performance but in terms of physical capital or social 
accomplishment. Second, this study analyzed the 
affect of a board of directors’ gender and ethnic 
diversity on a firm’s IC performance in a transitional 
economy. Prior studies have virtually limited such 
analysis to developed nations, predominantly the 
United States. 
Based on the empirical findings reported in this 
study it is recommended South African publicly 
listed firms attempt to construct a more balanced 
board of directors in terms of its gender and ethnic 
diversity. This balanced board structure will enable a 
firm to better establish coalitions with a wider set of 
required resources. By utilizing the skills, knowledge 
and capabilities of a broader resource base a firm will 
be able to enhance its IC performance. Thus, future 
wealth-creation potential and survivability is 
optimized. From a theoretical perspective, the results 
of this study support the application of resource-
dependence theory as a relevant conceptual 
framework for examining and explaining factors 
affecting IC performance. Also, results suggest that 
in the Information Age, the traditional product-based 
perception of a firm in South Africa may no longer 
be applicable. 
Findings from this study provided various 
contributions to the corporate governance and IC 
literature. For example, this study expanded prior 
research of the association between firm performance 
and a board of directors’ gender and ethnic diversity 
defining performance within a new context; that is, a 
firm’s IC performance. Further, this study provided 
one of the first empirical tests of the association 
between a board of directors’ gender and ethnic 
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diversity and firm performance in a transitional 
economy. This expands the understanding of the 
impact of corporate governance structures on firm 
performance under different environmental 
conditions. Overall, findings should interest a wide 
spectrum of internal and external stakeholders 
including company management, regulators, special 
interest groups and academic researchers. 
Apart from provide various insights, this study 
provides a valuable starting point for future research. 
For example, analysis in this study was cross-
sectional. A longitudinal study should be undertaken 
to determine if the associations identified in this 
paper hold over time. Second, this study only 
considered the relationship between two boards of 
directors’ composition characteristics and IC 
performance. Other board of director composition 
characteristics, such as overall board size, 
occupational experience of the directors or the age of 
the directors, can also be investigated for their impact 
on a firm’s intellectual capital performance. Finally, 
this project examined the noted associations in an 
isolated corporate governance setting. Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998, p. 403) argued the examination of 
corporate governance structures in isolation “may 
lead to spurious relationships and misguided 
conclusions.” In future studies, the associations 
analyzed in this research study should be examined in 
nations with different corporate governance 
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1 It is not the purpose of this study to rectify the differences 
in definitions underlying IC. For the purposes of this study 
the definition derived by the OECD (2000) is used. The 
OECD (2000) defined IC as the “economic value of two 
categories of intangible assets of a company: (1) 
organizational (structural) capital; and (2) human capital.” 
There is support in the literature for the use of this 
definition (Petty and Guthrie, 2000). Further, this definition 
is consistent with the measure of IC performance used on 
this study. 
2 Customer capital is often shown as sub-component of 
structural capital in many models. 
3 Traditional performance measures utilize financial 
criteria, such as the return on tangible assets or equity 
(Hoque, Mia and Alam, 2001). These measures are viewed 
as being too narrow in focus, considering a firm’s 
performance in terms of only its physical capital (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1992, 1993; Otley, 1999). Such measures have 
also been criticized for their historical nature or being 
incomplete in their focus (Ittner and Larcker, 1998). 
Empirical research findings have supported these concerns 
(Abernethy and Lillis, 1995). 
4 Use of the phrase ‘IC performance’ implies such 
measures attempt to gauge the firm’s performance of this 
component of a firm’s capital structure; this is a 
misconception. It is important to note IC performance 
measures attempt to measure firm performance based on a 
firm complete capital structure; that is, both its physical 
and IC. 
5 Methods under this approach identified respective 
components of IC from which point monetary values were 
then established. 
6 Measures in the category attempt to derive an estimate of 
the value of a company’s IC by reference to its return on 
tangible assets. 
7 Similar to Direct Intellectual Capital Methods, 
approaches under the Scorecard Method distinguished 
various components of IC for which a number of indicators 
and indices are generated. These are then reported in a 
scorecard format or on graphs. 
8 For a full review of these issues see Luthy (1998), Bontis 
(2000), Williams (2000) and Sveiby (2001). 
9A database from the Bureau of Financial Analysis 
operated by the University of Pretoria, for example, 
provided some information about directors of South 
African publicly listed companies. Such information was 
limited in its focus and often highly aggregated. As such, 
this information was helpful in filling some of the 
information points of this study but left many areas 
unanswered. 
10 Two batches of means tests were conducted to examine 
for non-response bias. The first set examined for any 
significant differences between specific factors known 
about the firms that supplied their annual reports and those 
failing to respond to the request letters. The second set of 
tests sought to establish if there were any significant 
differences between known characteristics of companies 
that responded early to the first request for their annual 
report compared to those firms that provided their annual 
report near the arbitrary cut-off date applied in this study 
for the return of annual reports. Statistical tests did not 
indicate any significant differences implying the lack of 
any non-response bias. 
11 A firm was defined as being research and development 
sensitive if it separately disclosed the amount of research 
and development expense in their annual report. 
12 Prior to conducting multiple regression tests Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficients were computed to 
determine the correlation between the independent 
variables and control factors. Results did not indicate any 
serious multicollinearity problems. As no serious problems 
were noted results of the correlation were not directly 
reported in the main text of the paper. Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient values, however, can be 
provided upon request.  
13 A firm was defined as being research and development 
sensitive if it separately disclosed the amount of research 
and development expense in their annual report. 
14 A firm was defined as being research and development 
sensitive if it separately disclosed the amount of research 
and development expense in their annual report. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Organizational Characteristics and 
Control Factors 
    
Total Assets R 16,670 mil. R 38,610 mil R 39.427 mil. R 191,000 mil. 
Sales Turnover R 8,350 mil R 10,530 mil R 40.010 mil. R 46,500 mil. 
Market Capitalization R 6,530 mil R 13,380 mil R 6.146 mil R 54,500 mil 
Majority Shareholder 59.98% 20.92% 11.10% 86.21% 
Number of Shareholders 4585 5750 500 25,586 
Return on Assets 12.65% 6.62% 0.38% 24.87% 
Total Debt / Total Assets 54.25% 21.96% 12.63% 95.11% 
Cash Dividends / Shareholder’s 
Equity 
3.83% 5.41% 0.00% 25.88% 
Director Features     
Total Number of Directors on the 
Board 
13.00 5.34 5.00 29.00 
Number Inside Directors on the 
Board 
6.28 3.36 2.00 14.00 
Number Outside Directors on the 
Board 
6.71 3.08 1.00 15.00 
Shares Owned by Directors 29,019,771 70,689,606 13,000 370,000,000 
Shares Owned by Inside Directors 23,875,814 59,336,263 12,000 30,500,000 
Shares Owned by Outside Directors 51,439,567 12,623,152 1,000 305,000,000 
Company Performance     
VAIC™ 4.269 2.426 1.961 8.451 
 
Table 2. Frequency of board composition in terms of gender and ethnic background, and IC performance 
 
 Number and Percentage of Company in Sample with Number of Directors on Board 
 None of Directors 
Meeting Feature 
One Director Meeting 
Feature 
Two Directors Meeting 
Feature 
Three or More Directors 
Meeting Feature 












































36 42.9 3.524 15 17.9 4.462 21 25.0 3.902 12 14.3 6.909 
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Table 3. Univariate results 
 
 Panel A – Female Directors versus No Female Directors on Board 
 Female Directors on 
Board (n=39) 
No Female Directors on 
Board (n=45) 
t-statistic Significance 
Mean VAIC™ 5.205 3.460 12.370 0.001* 
Std. Dev 3.128 1.123   
Mann-Whitney U z = -4.379; Significance p=0.000* 
Where: * = Significant at p< 0.05; ** = Significant at p<0.10 
Panel B – Non-White Directors versus No Non-White Directors on Board 
 Non-White Directors on 
Board (n=54) 
No Non-White 
Directors on Board 
(n=30) 
t-statistic Significance 
Mean VAIC™ 4.792 3.330 7.611 0.007* 
Std. Dev 2.833 0.891   
Mann-Whitney U z = -2.358; Significance p=0.018* 
Where: * = Significant at p< 0.05; ** = Significant at p<0.10 
 
Table 4. Multiple regression results of complete sample 
 
  Panel A – Model 1 Panel B – Model 2 Panel C – Model 3 
Variable Predicted Sign t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
Director Features        
PerGender Positive 7.050 0.000*   4.147 0.000* 
PerEthnic Positive   2.762 0.007** 2.992 0.004** 
Control Factors        
Lev Negative -6.197 0.000* -3.952 0.000* 3.098 0.003** 
DivYield Positive 2.355 0.021** 2.063 0.043* 2.399 0.017** 
Size Positive 1.063 0.291 0.878 0.383 0.634 0.528 
R&Dsen Positive 1.960 0.054*** 1.988 0.051*** 2.112 0.037** 
OwnerCon Negative 3.495 0.001* 2.387 0.019* 2.503 0.014** 
Intercept  0.985 0.328 0.861 0.392 0.799 0.425 
Model Summary     
Adjusted R-Squared  0.481 0.325 0.380 
F-Statistic  13.814 5.990 8.253 
p-value  0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 
Where:  
* = significant at p<0.001; ** = significant at p<0.0.05; *** = significant at p<0.10. 
Model 1 Equation: VAIC = a1 + α1PerGernder -α2Lev + α3DivYield +α4Size + α5R&DSen - α6OwnerCon + ε 
Model 2 Equation: VAIC = a1 + α1PerEthnic - α2Lev + α3DivYield +α4Size + α5R&DSen - α6OwnerCon + ε 
Model 3 Equation: VAIC = a1 + α1PerGernder + α2PerEthnic - α3Lev + α4DivYield +α5Size + α6R&DSen - 
α7OwnerCon + ε 
Diversity of Gender on Board of Directors (PerGender): - Percentage of female representation on the board of 
directors at the time the latest annual report prior to December 31, 1998 was published. 
Diversity of Ethnic Groups on Board of Directors (PerEthnic): - Percentage of non-white representation on the 
board of directors at the time the latest annual report prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
Leverage (Lev): - total debt divided by total shareholders’ equity as reported in each firm’s annual report; negative 
relationship to dependent variable. 
Dividend Yield (DivYield): - percentage of cash dividends paid during 2001 divided by total shareholders’ equity; 
positive relationship to dependent variable. 
Firm Size (Size): - natural log of annual sales as reported in each firm’s annual report; positive relationship to 
dependent variable. 
R&D Sensitivity (R&DSen): - dummy variable with firm’s determined to be research and development intensive 
(see endnote 13) coded a one (1), otherwise coded a zero (0) (technique used in prior research such as Wruck (1993) 
and Sanders and Carpenter, 1998); positive relationship to dependent variable. 
Ownership Concentration (OwnerCon): - percentage of outstanding shares owned by the firm’s major shareholders 
divided the company’s total number of outstanding shares. A firm’s major shareholder was defined as a shareholder 
holding more than 5% of the company’s total outstanding shares; negative relationship to dependent variable. 
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Table 5. Multiple regression results of complete sample 
 
  Panel A – Model 4 Panel B – Model 5 Panel C – Model 6 
Variable Predicted Sign t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
Director Features        
InsidePerGender Negative -1.902 0.063**   -2.505 0.014** 
OusidePerGender Positive 3.904 0.000*   3.841 0.000* 
InsidePerEthnic Negative   1.409 0.163 1.667 0.100 
OutsidePerEthnic Positive   2.545 0.013** 1.919 0.059*** 
Control Factors        
Lev Negative -6.531 0.000* -3.879 0.000* -2.946 0.004** 
DivYield Positive 2.580 0.012** 2.040 0.040** 2.092 0.039** 
Size Positive 0.279 0.781 0.876 0.384 0.472 0.639 
R&Dsen Positive 1.669 0.099*** 2.402 0.019** 3.452 0.001* 
OwnerCon Negative -3.688 0.000* -2.166 0.034** -2.342 0.022** 
Intercept  3.259 0.002** 0.840 0.404 1.330 0.187 
Model Summary     
Adjusted R-Squared  0.552 0.364 0.459 
F-Statistic  22.829 5.339 12.114 
p-value  0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 
Where: 
* = significant at p<0.001; ** = significant at p<0.0.05; *** = significant at p<0.10. 
Model 4 Equation: VAIC = a1 - α1InsidePerGernder + α2OutsidePerGernder - α3Lev + α4DivYield +α5Size + α6R&DSen - 
α7OwnerCon + ε 
Model 5 Equation: VAIC = a1 + - α1InsidePerEthnic + α2OutsidePerEthnic - α3Lev + α4DivYield +α5Size + α6R&DSen - 
α7OwnerCon + ε 
Model 6 Equation: VAIC = a1 - α1InsidePerGernder + α2OutsidePerGernder - α3InsidePerEthnic + α4OutsidePerEthnic - 
α5Lev + α6DivYield +α7Size + α8R&DSen - α9OwnerCon + ε 
Diversity of Gender on Board of Directors (InsidePerGender): - Percentage of inside female representation on the board of 
directors at the time the latest annual report prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
Diversity of Inside Ethnic Groups on Board of Directors (InsidePerEthnic): - Percentage of inside non-white representation 
on the board of directors at the time the latest annual report prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
Diversity of Gender on Board of Directors (OutsidePerGender): - Percentage of Outside female representation on the board 
of directors at the time the latest annual report prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
Diversity of Inside Ethnic Groups on Board of Directors (OutsidePerEthnic): - Percentage of outside non-white 
representation on the board of directors at the time the latest annual report prior to December 31, 2001 was published. 
Leverage (Lev): - total debt divided by total shareholders’ equity as reported in each firm’s annual report; negative 
relationship to dependent variable. 
Dividend Yield (DivYield): - percentage of cash dividends paid during 2001 divided by total shareholders’ equity; positive 
relationship to dependent variable. 
Firm Size (Size): - natural log of annual sales as reported in each firm’s annual report; positive relationship to dependent 
variable. 
R&D Sensitivity (R&DSen): - dummy variable with firm’s determined to be research and development intensive (see endnote 
14) coded a one (1), otherwise coded a zero (0) (technique used in prior research such as Wruck (1993) and Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998); positive relationship to dependent variable. 
Ownership Concentration (OwnerCon): - percentage of outstanding shares owned by the firm’s major shareholders divided 
the company’s total number of outstanding shares. A firm’s major shareholder was defined as a shareholder holding more 
than 5% of the company’s total outstanding shares; negative relationship to dependent variable. 
 
Appendix A. Steps in Calculating VAIC 
 
Step Number Description of Step Algebraic Description of Step 
One 
Calculation of value added during accounting period. Value added (VA) is the 
difference between a company’s output (Output) (overall revenue from all 
products and services sold in the market) less inputs (Input) (total expenses, 
excluding labour costs, incurred in generating its output).  
VA = Output – Input 
Two 
Ratio of value created from each unit of capital employed (CE) (physical and 
financial capital) by a company. This is termed the Value Added Capital 
Coefficient (VACA).  
VACA = VA / CE 
Three 
Calculation of the company’s efficient use of its human capital (HU). This is the 
ratio of the amount of value added for each unit spent on the company’s 
employees. This ratio is defined as the Human Capital Coefficient (VAHU). 
VAHU = VA / HC 
Four 
Relationship between a company’s structural capital (SC) (defined by Edvisson 
as Intellectual capital minus human capital) and the amount of value added. 
This relationship is calculated differently to VAHU because HC and SC are 
considered to be in reverse proportion to the creation of value. This is termed 
the Structural Capital Coefficient (STVA) 
STVA = SC / VA 
Five 
VAIC is the sum of the Value Added Capital Coefficient, Human Capital 
Coefficient and Structural Capital Coefficient. 
VAIC = VACA + VAHU + 
STVA 
 
